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2Incentive for Risk Sharing and Trust Formation:
Experimental and Survey Evidence from Bangladesh
Abstract
Using data from a unique household survey and an artefactual field experiment conducted in
rural Bangladesh, this study evaluates the impact on trust in community members of incentive
for risk-sharing arrangement between villagers. Risk sharing provides a major opportunity for
cooperation in rural economies, and the experience of cooperation could facilitate trust. In
order to test this hypothesis, this study characterizes the incentive for risk sharing by the
patterns of exogenous income shocks in the real world and risk preference, and trust in
community members is elicited experimentally. The empirical results from dyadic regression
demonstrate that villagers connected by a stronger incentive form a higher level of trust.
JEL Codes: C91, D12
Keywords: Trust formation; risk sharing; experiment; Bangladesh
31. Introduction
Interpersonal trust is an essential element for socioeconomic development, particularly in
developing countries. In rural communities, where members often engage in cooperative
behavior without a contract enforcement institution, – such as irrigation maintenance, credit
transactions, and mutual insurance – trust in the community members, namely particularized
trust, plays an important role (Bardhan 2000; Bouma et al. 2008; Carter and Castillo 2005;
Hayami 2009; Karlan et al. 2009; Wade 1988). Furthermore, trust in strangers, generalized
trust, also encourages cooperation in one-shot situations (Fukuyama 1995; Yamagishi and
Yamagishi 1994). Therefore, it is important for policymakers and researchers to better
understand their formation mechanisms.
Previous studies suggest that these two types of trust are accumulated through
different processes; particularized trust is formed through repeated interactions between the
community members (Banfield 1958; Shapiro et al. 1992), while generalized trust is
determined by one’s personal predisposition (Platteau 1994a; 1994b; Uslaner 2002;
Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). However, while various determinants of generalized trust
are discussed in the literature,1 the formation mechanism of particularized trust is less well
understood. Some studies find that particularized trust increases with the proximity between
individuals, such as ethnicity (Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004), neighborhood (Etang et al. 2011),
friendship (Binzel and Fehr 2013), and when low communication costs are involved (Fisman
and Khanna 1999). 2 Although these findings are insightful, they do not explain the
mechanism of particularized trust formation. This study attempts to address this question by
exploiting experiment and survey data collected in rural Bangladesh.
1 Generalized trust is found to be attributed to the income level of the community and its inequality,
political characteristics, market competition, and industrialization (Berggren and Jordhal 2006;
Bjornskov 2006; Bohnet and Baytelman 2007; Miguel et al. 2006; Huck et al. 2012).
2 See Lévy-Garboua et al. (2006) for further review.
4One likely explanation for the formation of particularized trust is grounded in the
experience of cooperation. Experiencing cooperation with an individual can facilitate
particularized trust in him or her by increasing the expectation about his/her trustworthiness,
the accuracy of the expectation, and the willingness to take the risk of trusting behavior
(Banfield 1958; Shapiro et al. 1992). Previous studies have consistently shown that
individuals who experienced collective actions with their community members exhibited
higher trust (Durante 2009; Feigenberg et al. 2013; Gneezy et al. 2015; Schechter 2007a;
Shoji et al. 2012).
In rural society, risk sharing arrangements for coping with negative shocks, such as
income loss and sickness, provide valuable opportunities for cooperation: given the volatility
of income and poor access to the formal insurance market, villagers have an incentive to help
each other by lending money and providing food (Fafchamps 2010). However, the extent of
cooperation among individuals varies with their incentive to share risk (Coate and Ravallion
1993; Fafchamps 1999; Kimball 1988; Kocherlakota 1996; Ligon et al. 2002). This suggests
that the incentive for risk sharing could foster particularized trust by facilitating opportunities
to cooperate. However, there is also a counterargument: people do not need to trust others if
their cooperation is guaranteed by the incentive (Gambetta 1998; Sitkin and Roth 1993;
Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Therefore, the impact of incentive on particularized trust is
not theoretically unambiguous.
The goal of this study is to test whether two villagers linked by a stronger incentive
to share risk form higher particularized trust. I use experimental and survey data of 1,920
dyads, collected from 279 randomly selected households in 16 Bangladeshi villages. The
incentive for risk sharing between individuals is characterized by their income correlation
over eight agricultural seasons, including a period in which there was a devastating cyclone,
5as well as by the trustee’s income volatility and risk preference.3 The cyclone caused damage
to agricultural and non-agricultural income at both the community and household levels,
providing opportunities to share risks during this period. This study elicits particularized trust
by modifying the experimental design of Berg et al. (1995). One distinguishing feature of the
current study’s design is that the study was conducted under both anonymous and
non-anonymous conditions in order to elicit generalized and particularized trust, respectively.
The maximum amount of payoff from this game is equivalent to nine days’ income in the
study area. Furthermore, this study addresses the possibility that behavior in the game is
affected by motives other than particularized trust, such as generalized trust, pure altruism,
warm glow, risk preference, and the wealth effect.
Since particularized trust was elicited only once after the household survey, this
study exploits the cross-sectional variation and regresses the current particularized trust on
the incentive for risk sharing, as well as the trustor fixed effects and predetermined dyadic
characteristics that could be associated with the baseline particularized trust. In order to
address the potential endogeneity issue of income correlation and volatility, this study
employs negative weather shocks such as drought and flood as instruments. An underlying
assumption for the use of shock variables is that the timing of experiencing shocks is
exogenous after controlling for the household fixed effects.
The empirical results obtained through the dyadic regression approach suggest a
positive effect of the incentive for risk sharing on particularized trust. Particularized trust is
higher when incomes are negatively correlated between the trustor and trustee, and when the
trustee faces higher income volatility and is more risk-averse. Although this study cannot
directly test the effect of incentive on the risk sharing behavior between the dyads due to the
3 The negative income correlation between individuals increases the incentive for them to share risks.
Similarly, those with higher income volatility face larger incentive to maintain the risk sharing
arrangement.
6limitation of data, it provides suggestive evidence that individuals are more likely to share
risks with someone in the village where there is a higher incentive to do so.
This study closely relates to Gneezy et al. (2015), Durante (2009), and Shoji et al.
(2012). Gneezy et al. (2015) conduct an anonymous trust game in two communities: sea
fishermen who work in groups and lake fishermen who work individually. The authors find a
significantly higher level of trust among the former than among the latter, implying that the
experience of group activities facilitates trust in the community members. Durante (2009)
finds that weather shocks experienced between the 16th and 18th centuries predict variation in
the current generalized trust across European countries, presumably because the repeated
experience of risk sharing over the centuries influenced personal predisposition. Shoji et al.
(2012) evaluate the causal impact of the incentive for Sri Lankan farmers to contribute to
community work—such as participation in community meetings and payment for religious
festivals—on trust in villagers. The current study differs from the previous studies in that this
study elicits particularized trust toward each community member and examines the dyadic
relationship, while previous studies utilize the measures of trust on the whole community.
The use of trust measure at the individual level allows us to uncover the underlying
mechanism of trust formation in more detail, by exploiting the variation in particularized trust
within one trustor across trustees. Furthermore, Durante (2009) and Shoji et al. (2012) elicit
trust by using subjective questions; however, other scholars express serious doubts about the
strength of such self-reported information (Glaeser et al. 2000). On the other hand, this study
uses the experimental approach to quantify particularized trust.
This study attempts to make two further contributions to the literature. First, it is
insightful to uncover the relationship between risk and trust in the context of developing
countries. Since such countries suffer from poor access to formal insurance and contract
7enforcement institutions, both risk sharing and trust are essential to their economic
development. However, the findings herein with regard to the positive association between
trust and the incentive for risk sharing predict that the introduction of formal
insurance—which reduces the incentive for risk sharing—could break down trust. This could
be an important contribution to our understanding of the effect of industrialization on social
capital: an effect which has long been discussed (Miguel et al. 2006; Polanyi 1944/1957).
Second, this study suggests the potentially negative effect of social proximity on trust. While
some previous studies find a positive effect of social proximity on trust, there also exist
studies that present insignificant effects (Aoyagi et al. 2014; Johansson-Stenman et al. 2009).
The findings of this study might in part explain their results: proximity leads to positive
income correlation, and therefore reduces the incentive to share risks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual
framework and establishes the testable hypotheses of this study. Sections 3 and 4 describe the
dataset and empirical strategy, respectively. Section 5 demonstrates the impact of incentive
for risk sharing on particularized trust, and Section 6 examines the relationship between the
incentive for and behavior of risk sharing. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1.Risk-Sharing Arrangements in Rural Economies
In developing countries, villagers’ income fluctuates over time due to various risks, such as
natural disasters, sickness, and unemployment. Given their poor access to formal insurance,
they share risk to smooth consumption, by lending money and/or providing food to those who
suffer from negative income shocks (Collins et al. 2009; Fafchamps 2010; Fafchamps and
Lund 2003; Jack and Suri 2014; Platteau 1994a; 1994b; Udry 1994). Such a risk-sharing
arrangement, therefore, plays the role of informal insurance, and it is a major source of
8cooperation in the village economy.
Existing studies show evidence of risk-sharing arrangements in the rural economies
(Ogaki and Zhang 2001; Park 2006; Townsend 1994); however, it has also been found that
limited commitment problems crucially restrict the efficiency of risk sharing (Albarran and
Attanasio 2003; Charness and Genicot 2009; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Dubois et al. 2008;
Fafchamps 1999; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Kimball 1988; Kocherlakota 1996; Kruger
and Perri 2006; Laczó 2014; Ligon et al. 2002). Since participation in risk-sharing
arrangements is voluntary for the villagers, they can deviate from the arrangement at any time,
without incurring any cost; however, such villagers are excluded from future arrangements
and end up in an autarky economy. Therefore, efficient risk sharing can be observed only
when the extrinsic incentive to maintain the arrangement is sufficiently high for all villagers.
The incentive increases with an increase in the lifetime utility under the arrangement and a
decrease in the lifetime utility under autarky. The former increases when incomes are
negatively correlated between individuals, as it enables them to pool more risk; the latter
decreases when income variation over time is high, and this effect becomes especially large
for risk-averse individuals.
2.2. Definition of Trust
This study defines trust in line with Coleman (1990) and Fehr (2009): an individual trusts if
she voluntarily places resources at the disposal of another party without any legal
commitment from the latter. Trust therefore is a behavior motivated by a trusting belief and
trusting preference (Coleman 1990). A trusting belief indicates a subjective expectation about
a trustee’s behavior, under the situation where the trustee does not have an extrinsic incentive
to behave in a prosocial manner (Ashraf et al. 2006; Barr 2003; Sapienza et al. 2013).
Trusting preference, on the other hand, is the willingness to take the risk of trusting behavior.
9This social preference is referred to as betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004;
Bohnet et al. 2008; Koehler and Gershoff 2003). Trusting behavior is facilitated by three
factors: (1) the expected level of trustee’s trustworthiness, (2) the accuracy of the expected
trustworthiness, and (3) the willingness to take the risk of trusting behavior. For those who
exhibit betrayal aversion, an improvement in the accuracy of expected trustworthiness (the
reduction of information asymmetries) has a positive effect on the trusting behavior.
Although one could take prosocial behavior by knowing that his or her opponent
does not have an incentive to betray him or her, such behavior is not considered trust in the
definition used here. Therefore, the definition used here differs from Hardin’s (2002)
calculative trust, which considers trust a rational expectation.4
2.3. Trust Formation Mechanism and Testable Hypotheses
Existing studies suggest that the incentive for risk sharing potentially increases the three
factors mentioned above (Banfield 1958; Shapiro et al. 1992; Sheppard and Sherman 1998).
In particular, Shapiro et al. (1992) claim that particularized trust is formed in three stages, and
that the incentive of cooperation is a necessary condition for the first stage. In the first stage,
the strong incentive to share risks between individuals enforces their cooperation, which
could, in turn, cause them to collude.5 Therefore, one believes that the probability for his/her
opponent to betray him/her is low, given the incentive to share risks. In other words,
calculative trust grows during this stage.
In the second stage, the frequent cooperation grounded in the incentive enhances
regular communication between individuals. This helps them accumulate knowledge about
the trustworthiness and personalities of each other. This knowledge, therefore, improves the
4 Hardin’s definition is in line with what Shapiro et al. (1992) call deterrence-based trust and what
Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) call assurance.
5 This is consistent with the argument of Murgai et al. (2002) and Genicott and Ray (2003).
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accuracy of the trusting belief.
Finally, the repeated interactions help both the trustor and trustee form social
preference. On the one hand, the trustee behaves in a more trustworthy manner, increasing the
trustor’s belief about the trustee’s trustworthiness. On the other hand, the trustor becomes
more willing to take the risk of trusting behavior as these interactions are experienced.
Therefore, these studies suggest that even cooperation as a result of a self-interested motive
could facilitate social preference toward the opponent.
Given this argument, this study tests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis:
Individual i should exhibit higher particularized trust in j when:
(a) their incomes are negatively correlated, and
(b) variation in j’s income is higher, and this causality becomes larger as j exhibits higher
risk aversion.
However, this hypothesis is not theoretically unambiguous. Gambetta (1998), Sitkin
and Roth (1993), and Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) claim that people do not need to trust
others if their cooperation is guaranteed by the extrinsic incentive. If this is the case, we
should rather observe the opposite or an insignificant relationship.
3. Data Description and Experimental Design
3.1. Household Survey
The study site is Satkhira district, located in southwest Bangladesh. This area is suitable for
examining the incentive for risk sharing and trust formation: since it is located in a river-delta
plain, the whole district is vulnerable to floods and cyclones. In particular, this district was
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severely affected by cyclone Aila in May 2009. It killed 190 and affected 4 million people in
the country. It also caused significant economic loss, destroying around 250,000 acres of
cropland and killing 150,000 livestock.6 The level of cyclone damage varied across villages
and even between households within the same village. Therefore, it affected households as
both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, providing opportunities to share risks.
The household survey was conducted in the district in December 2010, 19 months
after the cyclone. I employed a multistage stratified random sampling methodology. In the
first stage, I selected the three sub-districts (Upazila) of Samnagar, Kaliganj, and Ashashoni,
based on their economic status and the intensity of the cyclone damage. In the second stage, I
randomly sampled two Unions from each sub-district.7 In the next stage, four villages from
each Union and one cluster (Para) from each of the villages were randomly selected. Finally,
I selected 18 households from each Para.8 Since five households were unavailable for the
survey, I obtained a total of 427 of 432 sample households from 24 Para.
The questionnaire covered the magnitude of cyclone damage, evacuation behavior,
geographical characteristics, crime incidence, self-reported social capital, demographic
characteristics, asset holdings, savings, relief received from the government and
non-government organizations, membership of microfinance institutions, food and non-food
consumption, labor and non-labor income, experience of unanticipated shocks (floods, pest,
asset loss, etc.), and bilateral relationships among the survey households.
The main independent variables are income correlation between trustor and trustee,
and income variation of the trustee. In order to elicit this information, retrospective
information was collected on household income and experience of weather shocks for eight
periods over the January 2007–December 2010 period—namely, the dry and rainy seasons of
6 Department of Disaster Management, accessed on April 18, 2014,
http://www.dmb.gov.bd/pastdisaster.
7 The Union is an administrative unit in Bangladesh; each Union contains multiple villages.
8 In the survey area, the average Para size is 72.5 households.
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each year. The weather shock variables are self-reported binary variables that take unity if the
household experienced the shocks—such as drought or inundation—and zero otherwise.
From this retrospective information, I compiled a pseudo-panel dataset. Therefore,
eight-period panel data were available to compute variations in and correlations of household
income. Since these data are retrospective and self-reported, they are likely to suffer from
measurement error; this point is taken up in Section 4.2.
In the bilateral relationship module, the interviewers asked about current
relationships with each of the other 17 survey households in the same Para. The collected
information included the distances between their residences, and whether they attend the
same mosque, temple, or church. In cases where the respondents did not know the opponents,
they could not answer these questions, and so the dataset includes some missing values.
3.2. Experiment
Eight months after the household survey, the heads of the survey households in Kaliganj and
Ashashoni were invited to partake in an economic experiment that used real money.9 In cases
where the household head was not available, the next senior person representing the
household (usually the spouse) was recruited, to maintain the sample size. Ultimately, 279 of
the 285 households participated in the experiment. The experiment was implemented at the
local government office, and each day I conducted the experiment with 36 participants
invited from two villages. All 36 participants were first gathered in a room, and they were
then randomly allocated to two rooms. Each participant played the take-away game, dictator
game, trust game with hidden action, risk preference game, and trust game; however, this
study uses the results only from the dictator, risk preference, and trust games. The
experimenters were hired in Bangladesh, and since participants had an average of fewer than
9 The experiment in Samnagar was canceled due to flooding.
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six years of schooling (Table 1), the experimenters explained the experimental design slowly
and carefully. More details about the experimental procedure and instruction are described in
the Online Appendix.
After finishing all the games, each participant rolled two colored dice. Each color
represented a decision made during the games, and he/she received his/her payoff from only
one randomly selected decision.10 Therefore, the participants did not know from which
decision they received the payoff, and were aware that each participant had earned money
from a different decision. This payment process was explained to the participants prior to
starting the first game. This process is important for two reasons. First, it alleviates the
correlation of choices within participants across games due to the wealth effect. Second, if
participants had been able to earn money from all games and discuss the payoffs after the
experiment, they might have been able to infer the choices of the other participants. This
would have violated participant anonymity and potentially affected their behavior.
3.2.1. Trust Game
This study used the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) to elicit particularized trust. This game is
played by a randomly matched pair of participants. These participants are randomly assigned
roles—namely, a first mover (trustor) and a second mover (trustee). When the game starts, the
experimenter provides the first mover with an endowment of 300 Bangladeshi taka (BDT)
and the second mover with nothing. This amount is equivalent to about three days’ worth of
income in the study area. In the first stage of this game, the first mover decides how much of
the BDT300 to send to the second mover and how much to keep. He or she can send BDT300,
250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or none. The amount sent is tripled by the experimenter before it
reaches the second mover. In the second stage, the second mover can return some of the
10 Besides the payoff from the games, I also provided BDT100 as a participation fee. This is the same
amount as the median daily wage, as per the survey data.
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received amount to the first mover. Thus, the material payoff for the first and second movers
is 300 − ݐ+ ݎ and 3ݐ− ݎ, respectively, where ݐ and ݎ denote the amount to be sent to
the second mover and the amount to be returned to the first mover, respectively. The
maximum amount of payoff from this game is BDT900 (to the second mover, when t = 300
and r = 0). In the study area, this is equivalent to nine days’ worth of income.
A feature differentiating my experimental design from that of Berg et al. (1995) is
that it is conducted under both anonymous and non-anonymous conditions, in order to elicit
generalized and particularized trust, respectively.11 The first mover first decides how much to
send, without knowing to whom he or she is sending the money. After this, the participants
make decisions under a non-anonymous condition: I randomly divided the 18 participants
from the same Para into two groups (nine in each group), and the experimenter shows each
participant the name list of the other eight participants in the same group to ask how much to
send, if this game were played with each of them. Thus, eight dyadic observations were
collected from each participant.
After all participants have made decisions in the role of first mover, they make
decisions as the second mover. Again, they are asked how much to return under both
anonymous and non-anonymous conditions; the experimenter initially informs each second
mover how much he or she actually received from the paired first mover, but does not inform
from whom he or she received it. After deciding how much to return under the anonymous
condition, they are again shown the name list of the eight participants, and the participants
decide the amount to return to each of them.12
11 Although the strategy method has some potential concerns, Brandts and Charness (2011) shows
that, based on the results of a large number of previous studies, the results of the strategy and
direct-response methods are comparable.
12 The pair was determined prior to the game, and therefore, the endowment was transferred between
the real pair. However, the participants were not informed about the name of the real pair, but only the
names of eight potential opponents.
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In this game, the second mover has no extrinsic incentive to return money at the
second stage. Expecting this, it is rational for the first mover to keep all the money. In other
words, calculative trust does not exist for first movers. However, those who still expect
trustworthy behavior from the second mover and/or those who are willing to trust him or her
will send money. Therefore, the fraction the first mover sends to the second mover, ݐ/3,
captures trust, and the fraction that the second mover returns to the first mover, 100ݎ/3ݐ,
indicates trustworthiness.
3.2.2. Risk Preference Game
Risk preference is elicited based on the methodology of Schechter (2007b). This game is
similar to that involving the first mover of the trust game, but it is played alone. When the
game starts, the experimenter provides an endowment of BDT300 and a die. Participants
decide how much to bet on the die. They can bet BDT300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or none.
After the participant decides how much to bet, he or she rolls the die. The payoff in this game
depends on how much he or she bets on the die and the result of the bet, as follows:300 + ݖ(ܱ݀݀ݏ− 1). Here, ݖ denotes the amount participant i bets on the die, and ܱ݀݀ݏ
takes 0 if the die lands on 1, 0.5 if the die lands on 2, 1 if the die lands on 3, 1.5 if the die
lands on 4, 2 if the die lands on 5, and 2.5 if the die lands on 6. The level of risk aversion is
measured by the proportion of endowment to be bet on the die, given that more risk-averse
individuals are expected to bet lower amounts.
3.2.3. Dictator Game
This study uses the dictator game to elicit the pure altruism of participants. The experimental
design follows that of Forsythe et al. (1994). This game is played anonymously by a
randomly matched pair of participants, referred to as the dictator and recipient. When the
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game starts, the experimenters provide an endowment of BDT400 to the dictator and nothing
to the recipient. The dictator can then allocate BDT400, 350, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or
none to the recipient. The extent of pure altruism is measured by the proportion of
endowment allocated to his or her recipient.13 This study elicits this preference parameter
from all participants by using the strategy method across the roles in the game.
3.3. Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the characteristics of the households that participated in both the
household survey and experiment. The main industries in the area are agricultural crops and
shrimp farming, but only one-half of the households own their land. With respect to cyclone
damage, 32% of the sample households experienced inundation of their residence during
cyclone Aila, and its average duration was 0.34 months; they were, however, able to ask 11.9
households in the village for help during that time, if they wished.14 In fact, 19% of the
survey households borrowed from neighbors, friends, or relatives after the cyclone, implying
that risk sharing among villagers plays the role of insurance. However, still they could not
fully smooth consumption and some households had to skip meals after the cyclone.
Panel B summarizes the retrospective information on household income and binary
income shocks over the eight periods. The household income includes income from
self-employed (farm and non-farm), employed (farm and non-farm), and rent income. The
monthly average was around BDT4,200. In each period, negative income shocks such as
inundation and drought occur with a probability of around 10–20%. The correlation
coefficient of income among villagers is 0.28, on average.
Finally, Panel C presents the dyadic relationships among households in the same
13 Since this game was conducted after a take-away game, the rule was explained in this context. See
online appendix for details.
14 The size of the risk-sharing network is quantified by responses to the following question: How
many households in the village could you ask for help, if you were in need?
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Para. The share of dyads connected by friendship is 91%, and the average household has
known the other villagers for more than 20 years; additionally, 65% engage in the same
occupation category (shrimp, agricultural crops, transportation, shopkeepers, and others).
Figure 1 presents the results of the experiment. Figures 1(a)–(d) depict the results of
the trust game under anonymous and non-anonymous conditions. Out of 279 first movers, 64
sent the same amount to all the second movers. It appears that particularized trust is lower
than generalized trust on average, and that the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
The results for trustworthiness also show a similar tendency.15 Figure 1(e) shows the results
of the risk preference game. The participants bet about 50% of their endowment on average;
this is slightly higher than that observed in Schechter (2007b), who originally conducted this
game in rural Paraguay.16 Finally, Figure 1(f) shows the results of the dictator game. The
average amount of transfer is 46%, which is comparable to the results in the other
experiments conducted in developing countries (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008).
4. Empirical Strategy for Determinants of Particularized Trust
4.1.Estimation Model
This study elicits the level of individual i’s particularized trust toward individual j by
employing the proportion of endowment transferred from i to j in the non-anonymous trust
game. Although previous studies employ i’s expectation about the amount j will return (Barr
2003), this cannot capture the trusting preference or the accuracy of trusting belief, which are
also important components of trust. A potential drawback of my measure is, however, that the
amount of transfer can be attributed to other motives than particularized trust, such as
generalized and particularized altruism, reputation building, risk preference, and generalized
15 The data on trustworthiness include missing values, since 28 participants received nothing from the
first mover.
16 In Schechter’s experiment, the average proportion that was bet was 43%.
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trust. However, as I will argue in Section 5.1, these factors cannot fully explain the observed
patterns of transfer.
Specifically, this section estimates the following dyadic regression model:
ܶݎݑݏݐ௩௜௝ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝+ ߚଶ ܵܦ௩௝+ ߚଷ ܵܦ௩௝× ܤ ݁ݐ௩௝+ ߚସܤ ݁ݐ௩௝+ ܲݎ݋ݔ௩௜௝ߚହ+ܺ௩௝ߚ଺ + ܦ௩௜+ ߝ௩௜௝, (1)
where ܶݎݑݏݐ௩௜௝ represents the proportion of endowment transferred from participant i
(trustor) to j (trustee) in Para v; ܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝ denotes the correlation coefficient of incomes
between households i and j; ܵܦ௩௝ denotes the standard deviation of household j’s income;17
and ܤ ݁ݐ௩௝ represents j’s willingness to take risks, as quantified by the proportion of
endowment bet in the risk preference game. The hypothesis predicts that ߚଵ < 0, ߚଶ > 0,
and ߚଷ < 0 . ܲݎ݋ݔ௩௜௝ includes social proximity variables such as geographic distance
between their houses; two dummy variables representing the relationship between i and j,
such as relative and stranger (the reference group is friend/acquaintance); and three dummy
variables indicating whether the gender of the participants, the place of worship and
occupations of the households are the same, respectively.18 ܺ௩௝ is j’s characteristics, such as
the proportion of endowment allocated in the dictator game (pure altruism), proportion
returned in the trust game under the anonymous condition (generalized trustworthiness), and
17 One may suggest the use of coefficient of variation rather than the standard deviation, given that
the latter is positively correlated with the income level. However, it is inappropriate to use it, since the
household income can take a negative value, particularly during disasters. Therefore, this study
isolates the effect of average income by controlling for the holdings of productive assets.
18 As explained in Section 3, the dyadic data—such as the distance between residences and whether
they go to the same mosque/temple/church—are unobserved when individual i considers j as a
stranger. In these cases, the missing data are replaced with 0, and a dummy variable for stranger is
added to the independent variables (Greene 2011). Thus, the dummy for stranger captures both the
social proximity effect and the effect of missing values in the dyadic characteristics.
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asset holdings and demographics.19 Finally, ܦ௩௜ denotes the trustor (household) fixed effects,
capturing the trustor’s income volatility, generalized trust, risk preference, and
socio-economic characteristics.
Given the dyadic structure of the model, the residuals could be correlated over i and
over j. An approach to adjust the correlation of residuals is the use of dyadic standard errors
proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). However, since the residuals may be correlated
across households within Para as well, I use the clustered standard errors at Para level.
4.2. Endogeneity of Income Dynamics
An issue in the estimation of Equation (1) is endogeneity of income correlation (Corrvij) and
volatility (SDvj). Social capital plays a significant role in the income-earning behavior in
developing countries (Fafchamps 2004), and therefore, trust might also affect income
correlation and volatility. In order to address this issue, I employ the method of Albarran and
Attanasio (2003), which isolates the unanticipated component from the total income by
estimating the following equation:
݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁௝௧ = ∑ ߛ௞ ℎܵ݋ܿ ௩݇௝௧௞ହ௞ୀଵ + ܦ௩௝+ ௩߳௝௧ݐ= 1,2, … 8, (2)
where ݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁௝௧ denotes household j’s seasonal income per month at period t; ℎܵ݋ܿ ௩݇௝௧௞
takes unity if household j experiences exogenous income shock k at period t, and 0 otherwise;
and ܦ௩௝ represents household fixed effects that control for the anticipated component of
income. The shock variables include inundation due to cyclones and floods; soil salinization
caused by tidal waves; drought; pests, weeds, and animals; and the loss of productive assets.
These weather shocks affect agricultural and non-agricultural labor income significantly, and
19 In line with Schechter (2007a), participant j’s generalized trustworthiness is assumed to be
exogenous for i.
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the probability of being affected by the shocks is uncontrollable and unpredictable for
households, after controlling for the household fixed effects that capture the geographic
characteristics and time-invariant socio-economic characteristics. Therefore, I define the
income explained by these shock variables, ∑ ߛො௞ ℎܵ݋ܿ ௩݇௝௧௞ହ௞ୀଵ , as unanticipated income.
Finally, I use the unanticipated income to compute the exogenous standard deviation and
correlation coefficient. The estimation result of Equation (2) is reported in Table 2. As
expected, the inundation of fields significantly affected household income.
The use of weather shocks for the instrument, however, has the following issues that
need to be addressed. First, the characteristics of households vulnerable to the weather shocks
may be systematically different from those who are not. For example, they work on the
riverbank. They are also less concerned about risk management, and therefore do not invest
in pump tube-wells or pesticides. However, the occupation and location of the working place
are time-invariant, and the ownership of tube-well and input cost for farming do not change
across seasons in the dataset.20 Thus, the heterogeneity across households should be captured
by the household fixed effects. After controlling for the fixed effects, the timing of shock
should depend on exogenous factors, such as the precipitation in each season and the path of
tropical cyclones.
Second, a positive correlation in the experience of shocks between two households
may capture their geographic and socio-economic proximity. This has a direct positive effect
on particularized trust (Etang et al. 2011). Although this study controls for various dyadic
characteristics in Equation (1), the potential of unobserved characteristics leads to the
violation of exclusion restriction. However, as long as the estimated impact of income
correlation on particularized trust is negative, this issue should not affect the interpretation of
results.
20 The statistics is not reported in the paper but available from the author upon request.
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The third issue pertains to reverse causality; an increase in one’s trust in a particular
neighbor might influence his/her income earning behavior and therefore the probability of
being affected by the weather shocks. However, given that the average household can call for
help to as many as 11.9 neighbors (Table 1), it is unlikely that the development of trust in a
neighbor can be that influential. Nevertheless, for those with a small risk sharing network,
this might be possible. Therefore, as a robustness check, in Section 5.2 this study estimates
Equation (1) excluding the households that can call for help to fewer than five neighbors.
Fourth, given that the shock variables are self-reported, some households may
over-report their hardships more than others, even though their actual damages are
comparable, violating the exclusion restriction of the instrument. However, if one’s tendency
to over-report is time-invariant, the household fixed effects in Equation (2) should be able to
mitigate this problem. This assumption is likely to hold, since the data on the shock variables
were surveyed only once in December 2010. Therefore, the criteria for reporting the shocks
could be the same across the eight periods. Nevertheless, one might still be concerned that the
recall bias causes the measurement error in the shocks of the earlier period to be more serious,
particularly if the household head is older. Therefore, in Section 5.2, this study estimates the
model that excludes households where the head is aged over 60.
Fifth, the correlation and volatility of unanticipated income may affect particularized
trust through channels other than the incentive for risk sharing. For example, the dyads that
were affected by negative shocks at the same time may feel emotional sympathy, and this
facilitates particularized trust even without sharing their risks. Furthermore, those who
experience negative shocks more frequently may spend more time on income-earning
activities, and have fewer opportunities to communicate with the neighbors, suggesting the
negative effect of trustee’s income variation on particularized trust (Shoji et al. 2012).
However, again, they cannot explain the negative impact of income correlation and the
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positive impact of trustee’s income volatility.
Sixth, Table 2 shows that the instruments are weak: F-value for the joint significance
of the instruments is 4.45. This is presumably because the instruments are self-reported and
binary variables, and hence cannot measure the severity of shocks. This measurement error
causes the attenuation bias in the first-stage result. Therefore, the coefficients of Corrij and
SDj in the second stage should be biased to the direction of OLS estimates, and the standard
errors become larger. This issue is discussed in the next section by comparing the results of
OLS and IV.
Finally, this approach makes the correlation coefficient unidentified for 39% of the
dyads; 64 households reported no shocks during the survey periods, causing the variation in
unanticipated income to be zero. Therefore, in line with Greene (2011), I replace the
correlation coefficient with zero for such dyads and run the regressions with an additional
independent variable that takes unity if the correlation is unidentifiable and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, since these 64 households may not have answered the household survey
seriously, as a robustness check this study also estimates the model without these households,
in Section 5.2.
5. The Impact on Particularized Trust
5.1. Benchmark Result
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Equation (1). The table shows the positive effect of
the incentive for the risk-sharing arrangement; particularized trust is high if incomes are
negatively correlated between the trustor and trustee. A high standard deviation in the
trustee’s income is also positively associated with trust, and the impact is larger among
risk-averse trustees. In addition, the findings here are robust to the issue of weak instrument;
first, the signs of these coefficients are the same in the OLS and IV estimations, and the
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absolute values of IV coefficients are larger. Second, the standard errors in the IV estimates
are larger, but the coefficients are still statistically significant.
Importantly, however, the dependent variable might be affected by motives other
than particularized trust. First, the proportion of transfer is attributed to the trustor’s
generalized trust, risk preference, generalized pure/impure altruism, and fairness (Ashraf et al.
2006; Cox 2004; Ligon and Schechter 2012; Schechter 2007b). In addition, given that the
participants made decisions in front of the experimenter, concerns about their social image in
the eyes of the experimenters could have potentially affected their behavior. However,
presuming that the impact of these factors does not vary across the eight trustees, the trustor
fixed effects, Di, can capture these effects.
Second, the incentive for risk sharing might increase the transfer through the
development of particularized altruism to j rather than trust to j. However, the table suggests
that it cannot fully explain the patterns of transfer. If particularized altruism drives the larger
amount of transfer, the trustors should transfer more endowment to the poor and
cyclone-affected individuals, who can yield a larger utility gain from the transfer. Therefore,
we should observe the negative coefficients of the trustee’s asset holdings and education, and
the positive coefficient of cyclone damage. Such results are, however, not observed.
Third, if the participants do not perceive the behavior in the experiment to be fully
anonymous, they may transfer more to the opponents who they will ask for help in the future
(i.e., those with high incentive to share risks), so that they can build reputation. However, if
this is the case, they should transfer more to the opponents who they got to know recently too,
because the marginal effect of transfer on building reputation is expected to be larger. The
table, however, shows the opposite effect.
Regarding the other independent variables, most social proximity variables—such as
kinship, gender, occupation, and religion—are insignificant. The coefficient of dummy for
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stranger is positive because it captures the influence of unmeasured dyadic characteristics as
mentioned in Footnote 18. In addition, the trustor does not necessarily trust a trustworthy
and/or altruistic trustee; this finding is consistent with those of Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)
and Binzel and Fehr (2013), while it is inconsistent with that of Falk and Zehnder (2013). The
result does not change qualitatively when controlling for particularized rather than
generalized trustworthiness.21 This may be because the main motive for the transfer to j is
high willingness to adopt trusting behavior rather than high expected trustworthiness.
5.2. Robustness Checks
First, as discussed in Section 4.2, this section estimates Equation (1) without the samples of:
1) the households which can ask for help to fewer than 5 neighbors; 2) the households whose
heads are aged over 60; and 3) the households which did not report any weather shocks. Table
4 presents the results. They do not change qualitatively, supporting the validity of my
identification strategy.
Second, the benchmark specification uses the clustered standard errors at the Para
level. However, this might not fully adjust the correlation of residuals, given that this dataset
contains only 16 Para.22 Therefore, for robustness, I also employ the wild bootstrap
clustered standard errors proposed by Cameron et al. (2008). The results are reported in Table
5. The results do not change qualitatively.
Finally, this section also estimates the impact of incentive to share risks on
individual j’s trustworthiness to i. Specifically, the following equation is estimated:
ܶݎݑݏݐݓ݋ݎݐℎ݅ ݊ ݁ݏݏ௩௝௜= ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝+ ߚଶ ܵܦ௩௝+ ߚଷ ܵܦ௩௝× ܤ ݁ݐ௩௝+ ߚସܤ ݁ݐ௩௝+ܲݎ݋ݔ௩௝௜ߚହ + ܺ௩௝ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ܴ݁ܿ ݁݅ ݁ݒ ௩௝+ ܦ௩௜+ ߝ௩௝௜. (3)
21 The estimation result is not reported in this paper, but is available from the author upon request.
22 The asymptotic approximation relevant for clustered data relies on a large number of clusters.
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The dependent variable is the fraction of the received amount returned to i. This model
additionally controls for the proportion of endowment received from the paired trustor,
ܴ݁ܿ ݁݅ ݁ݒ ௩௝. Table 6 presents the results. Although the coefficients in the IV estimation are not
statistically significant and the income volatility presents the opposite effect, the OLS
estimation shows the result in line with the expectation. Pertaining to the other independent
variables, particularized trustworthiness is positively correlated with the trustee’s altruism,
consistent with Ashraf et al. (2006).
6. Incentive and Risk-Sharing Behavior
Thus far, this study assumes that the incentive for risk sharing facilitates risk sharing behavior,
such as informal loan transactions among villagers. This section tests the validity of this
assumption. It is straightforward to investigate the impact of incentive to share risks between
a dyad on their transactions. However, such information is unfortunately unavailable in this
dataset, and therefore this study provides suggestive evidence by examining the consumption
and borrowing behavior at the household level. Specifically, it tests whether the households
in the face of idiosyncratic income loss due to the cyclone: 1) borrow more from community
members, and thus 2) smooth consumption more, in the community with higher incentive to
share risk with the neighbors than in the community with lower incentive.
It is important to examine both borrowing and consumption behavior because the
households may smooth consumption via various coping strategies. The focus on only
borrowing behavior ignores other risk sharing behavior such as remittance. While the
analysis of consumption helps us understand the overall patterns of consumption smoothing,
the drawback is that this may also be attributed to other consumption smoothing devices such
as disaster relief from the government.
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First, the following borrowing equation is estimated:
ܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ௩௜= ∆݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁௜(ߚଵ + ܥ݋ݎݎ௩పതതതതതതതതߚଶ + ܵܦ௩തതതതതߚଷ) + ܲݎ݋ݔ௩పതതതതതതതതതߚସ + ܺ௩௜ߚହ + ௩ܸ + ߝ௩௜ (4)
where ܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ௩௜ is the amount of informal loans which household i in Para v borrowed
from his or her relatives, neighbors, and friends within 12 months after the cyclone in 2009.
∆݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁௜ is the first difference of monthly income between the agricultural season before
the cyclone and the season after.23 This variable is instrumented by the specification
employed in Equation (2). ܥ݋ݎݎ௩పതതതതതതതത, ܵܦ௩തതതതത, and ܲݎ݋ݔ௩పതതതതതതതതത are the mean of ܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝, ܵܦ௩௝, and
ܲݎ݋ݔ௩௜௝ over the households in the Para, respectively. Finally ௩ܸ indicates the Para fixed
effects. In this specification, it is expected that ߚଵ < 0, ߚଶ > 0, and ߚଷ < 0.
The estimation result from a Tobit model is reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.
Column 1 presents that the households in the average community borrow from informal
sources in the face of negative income shocks. Particularly, the association between them is
larger when the household income is negatively correlated with the neighbors’ income,
consistent with the expectation (Column 2). The coefficient of interaction between the
average income volatility and the income shock is counter-intuitively positive, although the
coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Second, this section also estimates the determinants of change in the meal frequency
as an approximation of food consumption. Negative shocks cause the members of poor and
uninsured households, particularly unproductive members such as females and elders, to skip
meals (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, Shoji 2010). An advantage of exploring the meal
frequency rather than the value of food consumption is that it is less likely to be affected by
recall bias. Since the frequency could vary across individuals within a household, I compute
23 The dependent variable does not take the first difference, given that the informal loans were rarely
observed in the period before the cyclone.
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the average meal frequency over the household members. While all the members in most
households took three meals a day before the cyclone, the average frequency went down to
2.75 meals after the cyclone (Table 1). The dependent variable here is the first difference
between the season before the cyclone and the season after, and the independent variables are
the same as the borrowing equation. It is expected that ߚଵ > 0, ߚଶ > 0, and ߚଷ < 0.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 present the result on the meal frequency, suggesting that
the incentive for risk sharing in fact facilitates consumption smoothing. The coefficient of
income change is positive and significant, while that of its interaction with income volatility
is negatively significant. This is in line with the prediction. Furthermore, although the
interaction with the income correlation is statistically insignificant, when the average income
correlation with neighbors is -0.3, the significant correlation between income shock and meal
frequency disappears. I also estimate an alternative model where the meal frequency of each
household member is weighted by the adult equivalent scale. The result is not reported in this
paper but does not change qualitatively.
Finally, the determinants of disaster relief from the government and NGOs are
analyzed with a Tobit model in Columns 5 and 6, given that the result of meal frequency
might be driven by effective disaster relief. It appears that the average income volatility rather
reduces the effectiveness of disaster relief as a risk coping device. Therefore, the result in
Column (4) cannot be explained by the efficient allocation of disaster relief. Overall, these
findings strengthen the validity of underlying assumption of this study.
7. Conclusions
This study shows that the incentive to share risk facilitates particularized trust formation
among villagers in rural Bangladesh. It also provides suggestive evidence that the higher trust
is caused by the increased opportunities of cooperation. Combining this argument with those
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of previous studies suggests the potential of a poverty trap. It has been shown in the literature
that an increase in trust helps individuals achieve more efficient risk sharing (Carter and
Castillo 2005; Carter and Maluccio 2003; Ligon and Schechter 2012). On the other hand, the
findings of this study indicate that a stronger incentive for risk sharing also causes higher
trust. Thus, community members with low initial trust might experience a slower growth of
trust than those with high initial trust.
Some possible policy implications may be derived, given that the provision of
incentive for cooperation is found to facilitate social capital. Improvements to formal
institutions so as to help villagers smooth consumption for idiosyncratic shocks can diminish
trust among villagers, since it makes them less dependent on informal risk sharing. This in
turn offsets returns to programs by lowering the efficiency of risk sharing. Such
trust-reducing policies include the introduction of health insurance, an increase in the wages
of unskilled labor, and reductions in the transaction costs of livestock sales. On the other hand,
participation in microfinance might enhance trust, as it strengthens potential punishments
against deviation. In line with this, there is empirical evidence showing the positive effect of
microfinance participation on social capital (Feigenberg et al. 2013). Furthermore, job
training programs that introduce a new industry in the community may also increase
particularized trust, since they cause the income dynamics of villagers to become less
correlated, and increase the net gains derived from risk sharing.
Finally, although this study finds an insignificant effect of social proximity on
particularized trust, it does not necessarily rule out its importance in a general setting. The
participants of this experiment are villagers in rural Bangladesh, and they are closely
connected with each other and communicate frequently. Assuming the decreasing marginal
effect of proximity on trust formation, the proximity measures used in this study may not
fully capture variations in social proximity in such communities.
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Additional Supporting information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix. Experimental Procedure and Instructions.
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Figure legends
Figure 1: Result of Experiments
Figure 1: Result of Experiments
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Symbol Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Household/ individual characteristics
X 1 if the household engages in farming of crops or shrimp 279 0.76
X 1 if the household engages in processing of crops or shrimp 279 0.13
X Value of land assets (106 Tk) 279 0.16 0.39
1 if land assets > 0 279 0.47
X Value of liquid assets (106 Tk) # 279 0.03 0.06
X Inundation of residence due to cyclone Aila (months) 279 0.34 0.66
1 if months of duration > 0 279 0.32
The number of households available to ask for helps in the village 279 11.9 11.4
Borrow The amount of loan from neighbor, friend or relative within 12 months
after the cyclone (103 Tk)
279 0.002 0.006
1 if the amount of loans before the cyclone >0 279 0.06
1 if the amount of loans after the cyclone >0 279 0.19
Average meal frequency over household members before the cyclone 279 2.99 0.10
Average meal frequency over household members after the cyclone 279 2.75 0.45
X Age of experiment participant 279 35.81 13.71
X Schooling years of experiment participant 279 5.84 4.07
Panel B: Retrospective characteristics
Income Seasonal income (Tk 1000/month) 2136 4.22 4.20
Shock 1 if experience saline soil 2136 0.14 0.35
Shock 1 if experience inundation 2136 0.13 0.33
Shock 1 if experience drought 2136 0.11 0.31
Shock 1 if experience pest, weed, animals 2136 0.19 0.39
Shock 1 if experience any asset loss 2136 0.10 0.30
SD Standard deviation of seasonal income (1000 Tk/month) 279 1.45 2.96
Corr Correlation of labor income between i and j 2132 0.28 0.42
Panel C: Dyadic characteristics
Proximity Distance between i and j’s houses (km) 2062 0.15 0.15
Proximity 1 if household i considers j as a stranger 2132 0.03
1 if household i considers j as a friend/acquaintance (reference) 2132 0.91
Proximity 1 if i and j are relatives 2132 0.06
Proximity Years since i gets to know j 2132 22.68 9.91
Proximity 1 if i and j go to the same mosque/temple/church 2062 0.85
Proximity 1 if gender of experiment participants are the same 2132 0.62
Proximity 1 if i and j engage in the same occupation category ## 2132 0.65
# Liquid assets include livestock, cell phone, grain storage, deposit at the bank account, jewelry, and
cash.
## It takes unity if both households are included in the same occupation categories, such as shrimp
(farming and processing), crops (farming and processing), transportation, and shopkeepers.
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Table 2: First Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Seasonal Income (BDT 1000/month)
(1)
1 if experience saline soil -320.545
(315.641)
1 if experience inundation -865.569***
(238.073)
1 if experience drought 11.069
(335.815)
1 if experience pest, weed, animals 658.050
(407.153)
1 if experience any asset loss -73.969
(329.327)
Observations 3,416
Number of Households 427
H0: coefficients of shock variables are jointly zero (F-value) 4.45***
Household FE Yes
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: The Impact of Incentive on Particularized Trust
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Endowment Transferred from the Trustor to the Trustee
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dyadic Characteristics
Income correlation# -2.328* -2.110** -2.318* -2.383**
(1.210) (0.931) (1.276) (0.948)
1 if correlation is unidentified 0.829 2.035
(1.586) (2.123)
Years since knowing 0.335*** 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.334*** 0.338*** 0.337***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.072) (0.076)
1 if relative 0.083 -0.118 -0.154 -0.112 0.045 -0.180
(2.779) (2.800) (2.787) (2.797) (2.818) (2.807)
1 if stranger 5.404* 5.299* 5.685* 5.120* 5.646* 4.955*
(2.618) (2.605) (2.736) (2.563) (2.693) (2.520)
1 if the participants’ gender are the same 0.927 0.803 0.995 1.022 1.037 0.889
(1.285) (1.300) (1.296) (1.289) (1.302) (1.303)
1 if the same occupation category -0.001 0.246 0.023 0.016 0.113 0.307
(1.547) (1.521) (1.580) (1.569) (1.517) (1.526)
1 if going to the same mosque -1.194 -1.287 -1.134 -1.445 -1.148 -1.580
(2.783) (2.700) (2.801) (2.686) (2.853) (2.646)
Distance between houses (km) 1.947 2.246 2.700 2.382 2.138 2.191
(5.345) (5.298) (5.336) (5.374) (5.437) (5.349)
Trustee Characteristics
S.D. of income 7.573* 0.040 10.160** -0.005
(3.891) (0.057) (4.612) (0.055)
S.D. × % bet in the risk preference game -0.116** -0.007** -0.114** -0.007**
(0.052) (0.003) (0.052) (0.003)
% bet in the risk preference game -0.002 -0.001 0.026* 0.011 0.026* 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Generalized trustworthiness -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 -0.014 -0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
% allocated in the dictator game -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Age of participant -0.041 -0.049 -0.051 -0.055 -0.051 -0.064
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.040)
Schooling years of participant -0.075 -0.098 -0.105 -0.075 -0.095 -0.090
(0.093) (0.106) (0.100) (0.091) (0.096) (0.100)
Land holdings 0.048 -0.170 0.010 0.116 0.291 0.204
(1.347) (1.338) (1.287) (1.490) (1.287) (1.507)
Liquid assets -0.181 0.472 -1.954 0.366 -2.548 1.240
(11.217) (11.084) (11.214) (10.889) (11.285) (10.842)
1 if engaging in farming 1.360 1.082 1.261 1.553 1.058 1.264
(1.593) (1.622) (1.651) (1.645) (1.611) (1.646)
1 if engaging in processing 3.417** 2.827* 2.965** 3.261** 3.254** 2.919*
(1.340) (1.429) (1.350) (1.355) (1.308) (1.417)
Inundation of residence (Months) -0.194 -0.304 -0.504 -0.246 -0.429 -0.239
(0.795) (0.840) (0.799) (0.821) (0.780) (0.835)
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
Number of trustors 279 279 279 279 279 279
Trustor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Robustness Checks for Different Sample Restrictions
Sample:
Risk sharing network
larger than five
Household head aged
60 or less
Experienced weather
shocks at least once
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dyadic Characteristics
Income correlation -2.853* -2.587** -2.996* -3.191*** -4.191** -2.544*
(1.448) (1.160) (1.647) (0.927) (1.759) (1.397)
1 if correlation is unidentified 3.215 2.364
(2.196) (2.481)
Years since knowing 0.351*** 0.345*** 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.248*** 0.258***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.079) (0.080) (0.071) (0.076)
1 if relative -0.553 -0.945 -0.608 -0.943 -0.654 -0.892
(2.673) (2.542) (2.453) (2.508) (3.162) (3.121)
1 if stranger 3.187 2.549 6.524* 5.440* 4.858 4.672
(3.476) (3.242) (3.196) (3.036) (4.233) (4.498)
1 if the participants’ gender are the same 1.108 0.887 1.566 1.309 0.065 -0.106
(1.526) (1.528) (1.532) (1.533) (1.263) (1.292)
1 if the same occupation category 0.201 0.381 0.381 0.711 3.838 4.044
(1.485) (1.437) (1.724) (1.776) (2.451) (2.383)
1 if going to the same mosque -2.540 -2.850 -1.484 -2.026 2.085 1.331
(3.177) (2.850) (2.618) (2.479) (1.429) (1.602)
Distance between houses (km) 1.790 2.273 2.508 2.115 1.036 1.758
(4.567) (4.481) (6.060) (5.867) (6.442) (6.181)
Trustee Characteristics
S.D. of income 12.822** -0.011 10.473* -0.043 16.976*** -0.032
(5.272) -0.054 (5.388) (0.070) (4.023) (0.099)
S.D. × % bet in the risk preference game -0.145** -0.008** -0.108 -0.008** -0.160** -0.007***
(0.052) (0.003) (0.063) (0.003) (0.070) (0.002)
% bet in the risk preference game 0.027* 0.007 0.023 0.009 0.038 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017)
Generalized trustworthiness -0.018 -0.024 -0.011 -0.017 -0.025 -0.029
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
% allocated in the dictator game -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.022 -0.020
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Age of participant -0.053 -0.066 -0.057 -0.076* -0.073** -0.089*
(0.040) (0.048) (0.034) (0.040) (0.029) (0.043)
Schooling years of participant -0.054 -0.047 -0.127 -0.131 -0.131 -0.147
(0.087) (0.096) (0.116) (0.125) (0.119) (0.116)
Land holdings 1.336 1.126 -0.553 -0.544 1.140 1.064
(1.525) (1.708) (1.152) (1.291) (1.388) (1.661)
Liquid assets -4.896 -1.091 -4.892 -0.257 -5.046 0.079
(12.581) (12.134) (11.426) (11.191) (6.446) (5.988)
1 if engaging in farming -0.418 -0.159 1.528 1.693 -1.708 -0.553
(2.197) (2.106) (1.632) (1.688) (2.572) (2.831)
1 if engaging in processing 2.933** 2.450 4.497** 3.994** 1.076 0.972
(1.373) (1.479) (1.577) (1.653) (1.526) (1.680)
Inundation of residence (Months) -0.241 -0.060 -0.656 -0.477 -0.816 -0.365
(0.772) (0.874) (0.868) (0.906) (1.004) (1.016)
Observations 1,640 1,640 1,716 1,716 1,168 1,168
Number of trustors 238 238 250 250 206 206
Trustor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Wild Bootstrap Clustered Standard Errors
IV OLS
(1) (2)
Income correlation -2.318* -2.383**
(0.096) (0.032)
1 if correlation is unidentified 2.035
(0.42)
S.D. of income 10.160* -0.005
(0.096) (0.944)
S.D. × % bet in the risk preference game -0.114** -0.007*
(0.044) (0.096)
Observations 1,920 1,920
Number of trustors 279 279
Trustor FE Yes Yes
Wild bootstrap p-values proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) are in parentheses (500 bootstrap
replications, with imposing the null hypothesis). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Since the coefficients are the same as Table 3, only the result on the coefficients of interest is reported.
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Table 6: The Impact on Particularized Trustworthiness
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Received Money Returned to the Trustor
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dyadic Characteristics
Income correlation -0.126 -3.897* -0.079 -4.272**
(4.643) (1.983) (4.812) (1.677)
1 if correlation is unidentified 6.838 0.736
(5.603) (7.151)
Years since knowing -0.130 -0.152 -0.135 -0.145 -0.133 -0.139
(0.108) (0.104) (0.113) (0.095) (0.115) (0.094)
1 if relative 0.534 0.131 0.272 0.100 0.307 -0.033
(3.613) (3.475) (3.603) (3.436) (3.652) (3.428)
1 if stranger -13.115** -13.863** -12.804* -14.838** -12.783* -15.156**
(6.030) (5.916) (6.215) (6.173) (6.221) (6.094)
1 if the participants’ gender are the same 3.154* 3.107* 2.698 3.638* 2.700 3.402*
(1.736) (1.723) (1.606) (1.728) (1.602) (1.769)
1 if the same occupation category -3.914 -4.232 -4.083 -4.398 -4.020 -3.877
(3.445) (3.235) (3.103) (3.229) (3.353) (3.267)
1 if going to the same mosque -1.027 -1.214 -1.141 -2.261 -1.143 -2.542
(4.986) (4.822) (4.984) (5.262) (4.995) (5.230)
Distance between houses (km) -7.657 -7.566 -6.980 -7.209 -7.042 -7.513
(6.854) (6.807) (7.072) (7.261) (7.029) (7.186)
Trustee Characteristics
S.D. of income -21.854 0.669** -21.161 0.585**
(14.764) (0.258) (13.635) (0.263)
S.D. × % bet in the risk preference game 0.008 -0.033* 0.009 -0.033*
(0.213) (0.017) (0.215) (0.017)
% bet in the risk preference game 0.055 0.054 0.044 0.107 0.045 0.106
(0.071) (0.070) (0.102) (0.072) (0.100) (0.072)
% allocated in the dictator game 0.280*** 0.274*** 0.279*** 0.281*** 0.280*** 0.282***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.064) (0.060) (0.063)
Age of participant -0.033 -0.047 -0.025 -0.087 -0.026 -0.105
(0.102) (0.107) (0.106) (0.094) (0.106) (0.098)
Schooling years of participant 0.894* 0.857* 0.907* 0.932* 0.908* 0.905*
(0.489) (0.473) (0.487) (0.469) (0.492) (0.468)
Land holdings 0.124 -0.255 -0.096 0.392 -0.053 0.568
(4.984) (5.007) (5.050) (5.464) (4.955) (5.522)
Liquid assets -1.071 -3.487 6.152 -2.830 6.172 -1.580
(34.599) (37.024) (31.815) (35.055) (31.891) (34.863)
1 if engaging in farming 4.886 4.326 6.478 5.421 6.430 4.927
(3.505) (3.362) (3.742) (3.612) (3.845) (3.491)
1 if engaging in processing 3.999 2.719 3.652 2.756 3.712 2.136
(4.455) (4.205) (4.249) (4.679) (4.290) (4.548)
Inundation of residence (Months) 3.627 3.110 4.094 3.241 4.119 3.251
(3.691) (3.590) (3.612) (3.509) (3.702) (3.541)
The amount received from trustor (Tk) -0.036 -0.033 -0.038 -0.032 -0.038 -0.031
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
Number of trustors 279 279 279 279 279 279
Trustor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Incentive and Risk Sharing Behavior
Dependent variable: Informal loans Meal frequency Disaster relief
IV IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Income -9.57* -36.12*** 0.023 0.365** 1.09 -17.73*
(5.29) (11.30) (0.062) (0.170) (2.46) (9.97)
∆Income x ܥ݋ݎݎതതതതതത 33.10*** 0.073 2.99
(11.53) (0.289) (8.50)
1 if ܥ݋ݎݎതതതതതത is unidentified 1.45 0.089* 2.73
(7.32) (0.046) (4.51)
∆Income x ܵܦതതതത 35.74 -1.338** 58.92*
(29.79) (0.548) (31.95)
Household Characteristics
% bet in the risk preference game 0.06 0.07* -0.000 -0.001 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.001) (0.001) (0.06) (0.06)
Generalized trustworthiness 0.06 0.04 0.001 0.001 -0.09 -0.11
(0.09) (0.08) (0.001) (0.001) (0.09) (0.09)
% allocated in the dictator game -0.02 0.00 -0.001 -0.001 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.001) (0.001) (0.04) (0.04)
Age of participant -0.07 -0.07 0.002 0.002 0.30** 0.29**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.002) (0.002) (0.13) (0.13)
Schooling years of participant 0.12 0.09 0.008 0.010 0.40 0.37
(0.47) (0.49) (0.008) (0.008) (0.36) (0.35)
Land holdings -12.68 -12.77 -0.011 -0.009 -7.55 -7.13
(12.74) (13.44) (0.100) (0.100) (7.43) (7.24)
Liquid assets 62.53*** 49.29** -0.551 -0.380 14.47 1.53
(23.25) (23.01) (0.701) (0.849) (44.17) (50.54)
1 if engaging in farming -1.91 -3.30 -0.103 -0.118 -0.10 0.13
(3.16) (3.30) (0.137) (0.133) (3.17) (3.15)
1 if engaging in processing -6.91 -6.77 -0.110 -0.105 -9.59 -8.45
(6.37) (6.73) (0.138) (0.132) (6.99) (6.66)
Inundation of residence (Months) -6.08 -5.69 -0.114* -0.111* 1.13 1.11
(4.38) (3.56) (0.059) (0.060) (3.92) (3.98)
Mean dyadic characteristics at the Para level
Years since knowing -0.09 -0.09 -0.000 0.000 -0.52* -0.58*
(0.23) (0.22) (0.005) (0.004) (0.27) (0.31)
1 if relative -16.70 -9.86 0.112 0.115 10.15 14.51*
(11.96) (11.60) (0.218) (0.221) (7.50) (8.22)
1 if stranger -158.63** -147.49** 0.425 0.382 -28.59* -32.66**
(61.85) (62.16) (0.328) (0.325) (16.71) (15.78)
1 if the same occupation category -2.70 -3.82 0.419* 0.528** 10.08 9.45
(8.59) (8.86) (0.225) (0.239) (8.29) (8.00)
1 if going to the same mosque -15.68* -14.28** -0.107 -0.141 -14.56** -13.96**
(8.79) (7.22) (0.098) (0.108) (6.85) (6.91)
Distance between houses (km) -40.13 -41.79* 0.618 0.646 -41.85 -39.80
(26.46) (23.70) (0.428) (0.432) (31.63) (29.16)
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251
Uncensored Observations 52 52 - - 72 72
Para FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
